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The Venezuelan Navy has evolved over the last 30 years
into a very professional, well trained, and highly educated
organization. Even so, it is still confronting several
organizational problems. Although the second smallest of
the Armed Services of the country, the Navy is responsible
for very sophisticated weapon systems and for being, main-
taining and operating an efficient peacetime force. Today,
the Venezuelan Navy faces one of its greatest challenges,
namely to keep its high performance standards in the face
of a huge budget cut, resulting from the income reduction due
to declines in the world's oil price. This thesis examines
the need to bring Organization Development into the organi-
zation in the immediate future. After analyzing the Latin-
American environment, the Venezuelan Socio-Cultural traits,
and the Navy's particularities, the concept of "tropicalized"
OD is brought into the discussion. The view is taken that
in order to effectively use OD, consideration of the adapta-
tions of OD practice are required to help the Venezuelan
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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis presents an approach for achieving expected
organizational goals within the Venezuelan Navy. The under-
lying body of knowledge to support the approach will be based
upon the concepts and techniques of Organizational Develop-
ment (OD) . The author proposes that the usage of certain
OD characteristics and techniques will help the organization
to cope with the actual challenge posed by the complex tech-
nology of newly acquired weapon systems and by the new
generation of better prepared manpower resources entering
the Venezuelan Navy's environment.
A. FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS
Organization Development will be defined as the inter-
disciplinary process of using behavioral science, organization
theory, humanistic theories, and other related ones that
traditionally have been used for attempting to improve organ-
izational effectiveness. Later, a more formal discussion
will be presented. It is the premise of this thesis that
before any attempt is done to use OD techniques in the
The author wants to express that the views and opinions
written or implied in this thesis are exclusively his and
in no way involve any Official or assumed approval from his
Government nor host Organization.
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Venezuelan Navy, those techniques should be subject to an
adaptive process (hereon referred as "tropicalization process")
to make them more compatible with the characteristics and
cultural traits of Latin America in general and of Venezuela
in particular.
B. ENVIRONMENTAL SETTING
The Venezuelan Navy personnel represents about 16 percent
of the country's total Armed Forces, and includes the Marine
Corps which represents about 4.5 percent of that total. The
other branches of the Armed Forces of the country are the
Army, Air Force and the Armed Forces of Cooperation (National
Guard) . The truly professional Armed Forces of the country
developed after World War II. By the 1970' s, Venezuela's
armed forces were among the most modern and professional in
Latin America. This advance has been attributed to many
factors, among the most important being the vast petroleum
revenues available to the government for modernizing its
military establishment, which in fact they began doing at
gigantic steps. In addition to providing excellent social
and physical living conditions for members of the armed
forces, the large defense budgets of the early 1970 's were
used to buy quantities of modern weapons from different
countries (France, West Germany, England, Italy, Belgium
and the United States) , in sufficient amount as to arouse
criticism by opposition leaders in the country (and official
11

denials) that Venezuela was fueling a Latin America arms
race [Ref. 1] . It is also important to note that the Vene-
zuelan military officer, after being generally hated and
feared as an agent of repression during most of the first
half of the century, had by the 1970s attained a generally
respected position in society as a well-paid professional
person. This concept has today spread to include not only
the Officers but the Petty Officers as well [Ref. 2]. The
author now will turn to a general analysis of the political
setting and social context facing the Armed Forces. It is
important to recognize that the political setting is a sub-
set of, and consequence of the environment. The Venezuelan
Constitution provides that the Armed Forces are to form a
nonpolitical , obedient and nondeliverative institution [Ref.
3], a fact which has been respected up to the present.
Those that have violated this statement have been prosecuted
in accordance with the law. The same constitution invests
the Armed Forces with the responsibility to sustain and
insure the defense of the integrity, independence and freedom
of the nation. It is important to also note that Venezuela
is the only country in South America that has never gone to
war with one of its neighbors. At this time, however, the
persistence of two long-standing border disputes, one with
Colombia to the west and another with Guyana to the east,
keep the Armed Forces prepared for such an eventuality. As
can be inferred from the above statements, by having a
12

relative absence of external aggressors, the primary mission
of the Armed Forces has been the preservation of internal
order and security. This fact in the nation's history meant
suppression of opponents of the dictator in power. During
the 1960s, however, when the threat to internal security
emanated from leftist guerrilla activity, backed by Cuba
and Moscow, all branches of the Armed Forces participated
in successful counterguerrilla activities that strengthened
both the Armed Forces and the development of the current
democratic status. [Ref. 4]
The Armed Forces then, have and are playing an important
role in the national development. This can be seen in the
growth of their involvement in civic action programs designed
to promote rural development and in doing so, to build rapport
with the local population and thus undermine popular support
for the guerrillas or any other possible source of social
unrest. Among the most relevant projects is the construction,
by the army's Gran Sabana operations, of a 200-mile highway
to open communication and transportation with the Guyana
Highlands (in the south of the country, near the Erazilian
border). In another similar operation, the army constructed
a highway and an airport in the remote Amazonas territory.
On the Margarita Island (one of the country states situated
at the North East, 90 miles off the coast), the Navy assist-
ed in the construction and placement of an aqueduct to supply
fresh water to its 200,000 inhabitants. The Air Force and
13

Navy have also been helping to provide support and transpor-
tation of food, facilities and equipment at many otherwise
inaccessible locations. Other military projects are aimed
at improving such areas as education, health, fishing and
agriculture and providing assistance during disasters result-
ing from floods and earthquakes.
The most recent developments have been the creation of
a National Military Industry, which included both the Naval
and Aeronautical Industries as well as an ongoing project
for setting up large shipyards and shipbuilding facilities.
The ultimate objective of these efforts is to develop the
capacity to supply most, if not all, of their total arms
needs. [Refs. 2,5]
C. VENEZUELAN NAVY'S CHALLENGES TODAY
As a result of the increasing involvement of the Armed
Forces of the country in both governmental and industrial
settings, there is an expanding demand for competent manage-
rial resources at all levels. Such demands go well beyond
what has been considered the typical profile of an officer.
These needs, as well as those of many developing industries
(many created as corporate partnerships between government
and private industry) , have also created a demand for more
specialized officers, not only to achieve positive performance
in those industries but to keep the Armed Forces at the
required efficiency level as well.
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The Navy in particular has been trying to keep pace,
but has been having difficulties in achieving enough flexi-
bility to overcome the burden of the traditional bureaucracy.
To make things more complicated, the recent acquisition of
six of the most advanced and sophisticated frigates in South
America (Frigates LUPPO class, Italian custom made), have
created a strong pressure for an almost radical and prompt
change in many of the systems and procedures that could have
been labeled traditional. Also, these sophisticated weapon
systems will require a need for change in the logistics
approach, the operational environment, the tactical environ-
ment and most notably in the manpower and training system.
The author has observed that traditionally the Venezuelan
Navy is no different from many other organizations when it
comes to the area of resistance to change. This is especial-
ly critical concerning the relationship of the change agent
to the organization [Ref . 7] . This particular characteristic
is compounded by the belief that any outsider will first
have to understand the organizational setting and internal
environment before attempting to do or say anything. If it
is an outsider from a foreign country, resistance increases
and the situation becomes still more complicated when that
outsider (individual or group) does not communicate in their
language (Spanish). Furthermore, the Venezuelan Navy is and
behaves as a very traditional organization, a fact that has
created a lack of fit with a country which is moving very
15

fast in the developmental trend. This of course creates
social, political and economical maladjustments, which in
turn creates a need for expertise in order to correct that
lack of fit. Also, a need exists for the organization to
be able to reshape, adapt and learn to become flexible so
their potential for effectiveness can be improved.
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
Because of this, the author proposes that by using ade-
quately "tropicalized" OD techniques either by an internal
or external individual or group, acting as a change agent
can assist the organization in understanding and accepting
OD. Then OD can be used in designing and manage the transi-
tion stage on to achieving the desired future state.
The next three chapters will explore the characteristics
of the Venezuelan culture and society, the philosophies and
principal values of contemporary OD in the United States,
the adjustments and the shaping of OD techniques necessary
to satisfy the Venezuelan environment, and finally a theoret
ical model is presented which outlines how to increase the
probability of achieving and sustaining desirable changes
in the Venezuelan Navy environment.
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II. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE VENEZUELAN SOCIETY
A. SOCIAL CONTEXT OF POLITICAL INFLUENCE
The modern Venezuela, since its now lasting Democracy
and well established support for the institution of elections
(fact that can be assessed from the high turnover at the
time of the last suffrages) is a very atypical country for
setting up the stereotype of a typical Latin American coun-
try. The author considers it important to draw a distinction
between the four following political elements: (1) the
government itself; (2) the government's policy outcomes and
outputs; (3) the political party in power; and (4) the
different institutional actors that function under the regime's
operational norms (like the Ministers and the Chairmen of
semi-state corporations). For the purpose of this thesis,
it is considered useful to separate and distinguish "diffuse
support" for the democratic regime from "specific support"
for those institutions found in it. There is really no
reason to expect a high degree of correspondence between the
two, especially in a competitive political system like the
Venezuelan, in which government turnover has become a legiti-
mate outcome of the political process. In addition, it is
2 Semi-state corporations are those whose ownership is
51 percent government and 49 percent private investors.
Their Chairmen report to a Minister of State.
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important to determine the social location of criticism in
order to better understand the nature of the regime [Ref. 8].
Following David Easton's definition of politics as "the
authoritative allocation of values" [Ref. 9] , the author will
treat criticism and discontent as natural consequences of
the political process, and not as symptoms of disorientation,
misinformation, or inadequate political socialization. Along
these same lines, the author will adopt the view that evalu-
ation of political institutions is a result of previous
individual and group experience in dealing with the actor or
institution subject to such evaluation. The more critical
or adverse the evaluation, the more negative these experiences
are likely to have been. In one of the recent evaluations
done in Venezuela, presented in the book written by Baloyra
and Martz [Ref. 10] , they found that socioeconomic differences
do not constitute a major influence on the public's support
for the operational norms of the democratic regime or in the
evaluation of its policy outcomes. Support for the opera-
tional norms of the regime is relatively high among all
classes, strata and groups, while criticism of regime poli-
cies and party politicians follow a similar pattern.
As the country has matured in its political context, a
polarization has developed with the two major parties, COPEI
(Social Christian) and AD (Social Democrat). In elections,
COPEI stands for Comite para Organizacion Politica
Independiente , and AD stands for Accion Democratica.
18

the two parties generally get about 80 percent of the total
votes with the other 20 percent divided among the MAS (Movi-
miento al Socialismo) , some independent parties and a tiny
fraction going to the communist party. Also, military pro-
fessionalism has matured and evolved as the Armed Forces
became engaged in the democratic process that effectively
began on January 25 of 1958.
As a conclusion of this section, it can be stated that
political parties are the vehicle through which Venezuela
has attained and so far maintained its democracy. All other
interest groups have accepted the predominant role of the
parties and the parties have accepted, and indeed insisted
upon, the subordinate role of interest groups, while simul-
taneously soliciting their help and serving them. The
electorate and the politically influential parts of Venezuela's
society regard democracy as a highly imperfect but workable
system which inflicts fewer losses and confers greater bene-
fits for all participants than other political forms. Economic
progress has played a central role in making the system
function and its rules effective. Some additional comments
will be presented in the section "Economic Characteristics",
later in this chapter.
B. VENEZUELAN SOCIETY








Each of these is explained as follows.
1 . Its Origin and Evolution
The Venezuelan society is an amalgam of three races-
White, Indian and Negro. Although ethnic background was an
important criterion of status in colonial times, it became
less so as "mestizaje" (the genetic mixing involving various
combinations of any of the three) made distinguishing between
racial types increasingly difficult. Eventually, ethnic
categories came to be regarded as points along a continuum
rather than as discrete entities, and physical appearance
and skin color became a major criteria for determining status
Even though this area has proven conflicting in many other
countries, in Venezuela no national census has classified
the country according to ethnicity since 1926, so only rough
estimates of the national composition can be made. In the
mid-1970s between 10 and 25 percent were white, between 3
and 10 percent black, and between 4 and 7 percent mulatto;
less than 1 percent were Indian, and between 60 and 90 per-
cent were mestizos (now meaning a mixture of any of the
four). The only consideration given to such categories in
following censuses was a separate count of tribal Indians.
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At the beginning of the sixteenth century, the territory
that is present-day Venezuela was a kaleidoscope of Indian
groups of widely varying cultures and linguistic affiliations.
The more advanced groups were ruled by a "cacique" (chief)
and supported by a priesthood to serve the local temples,
whereas the more primitive groups lived as wandering hunters
and gatherers or as seminomadic s lash-and-burn farmers.
The Spanish conquest resulted in a rapid and widespread
extermination of indigenous groups. Enslavement under in-
human conditions, constant warfare, epidemics of hitherto
unknown diseases, and famines all took immediate tolls. There
are no reliable statistics available and hence it is impos-
sible to estimate the loss of Indian life in the first years
of Spanish rule, but it can be stated with certainty that
in the first century of that rule at least twenty of the
most populous tribes became extinct. Those that survived
were brought to economical and political control and converted
to Christianity. Mission outposts were founded by various
religious orders. A system that dispersed groups of Indians
and forcibly resettled them in accessible towns under the
supervision of Church authorities was known as "reducciones"
(reductions) . Under another system, the "encomienda" (in
charge of) , individual colonists were given the right to
collect tribute from Indians within a specific territory in
return for undertaking their religious conversion. Each of
21

these systematic methods of pacification made a profound
cultural impact on the native peoples.
By the end of the sixteenth century, the role of the
Indians in the national ethnic structure had been fully set
and the most populous tribes were virtually extinct, their
surviving members subject to bondage under the Spaniards.
Those few that were able to escape fled to the jungles, but,
unable to find environments that would support large seden-
tary populations, they quickly lost the more complex patterns
of their social and political life and came to resemble the
primitive forest peoples. [Ref. 11]
As the agricultural economy flourished and as was said
before, the Indian population diminished, the colonists
turned to importing African slaves to meet their needs for
a cheap source of labor. Large numbers of slaves were import
ed from many ethnolinguist ic groups from the sixteenth to
the seventeenth centuries. Uprooted individually from their
native groups and held, often for months, in slave ports,
along with widely differing peoples, they had little opportu-
nity to maintain either their native languages or their
tribal customs. Only occasional words, religious concepts,
and beliefs survived as part of the folk culture, whose re-
mains can today be seen in a region by the northern coast
called Barlovento, in the Estado Miranda about 120 miles
west from the capital Caracas. The author used the word
"remains" because many of the slaves were brought not mainly
22

from Africa but from other American colonies, particularly
the nearby Antilles by the Caribbean. Acculturated Spanish-
speaking blacks were smuggled in large numbers , along with
other "merchandise", in unlicensed ships, and their presence
to some degree impeded the reestablishment of African cul-
tural patterns in Venezuela.
Although in many instances the black slaves of Venezuela
were mistreated and worked under inhuman conditions, they
had a social and legal status that was vastly different from
the slaves in British colonies. Whereas a slave in North
America was considered the absolute property of the master,
who coulfl not be held responsible before law for any mis-
treatment, the Spanish colonial system provided several means
of recourse for a slave who felt ill used. Homicide and
physical cruelty to a slave were legally punishable, even
if committed by the master. In addition, any slave who
established that he had been badly treated could demand in
court that he be sold to another master. And, whereas Anglo
American law held that a slave had no civil rights - -being
the equivalent legally of a nonperson- -Spanish American law
gave him the right to contract for binding marriage and to
own, bequeath, and dispose of property. In general, Spanish
4
colonial law encouraged manumission, whereas North American
law was designed to discourage the freeing of slaves.





Social custom reflected the law in the relations between
masters and slaves. Mestizaje was quite common, and the
offsprings of liaisons between the master and his slave
women often held a privileged status, frequently being freed
at adult stage and occasionally even being provided with a
modicum of education. The act of manumission came to be a
common means of celebration; it was customary, for example,
to offer freedom to a young slave on a festive occasion
like a birthday or a wedding in the master's family. [Ref.
12]
The result of this legal and social tradition of slavery
was the rapid growth of a population of freedmen working as
manual laborers in the cities or living as peasants on mar-
ginal lands. Although throughout colonial days blacks,
whether free or slave, occupied a very low social status,
they never felt themselves to be a part of a foreign and
segregated ethnic group, but rather identified themselves
as closely as possible with the society and culture repre-
sented by the Spaniards. From the outset Venezuelan social
structure then was static and rigidly stratified along
classes and color lines developed under the influence of
Hispanic values and the Roman Catholic church. A small num-
ber of more or less pureblood white occupied the top rung
of the social ladder by virtue of their status as landlords
and preservers of the Hispanic heritage. This heritage
stressed the importance of the patriarchal extended family,
24

the primacy accorded individual uniqueness and dignity, the
disdain for manual work, and the distinction between the
roles of males and females. Machismo, the complex of beliefs
and attitudes that came to define masculinity, stressed
chivalry, virility, courage and daring, played an important
part in Venezuela's sociopolitical development. It was a
vital ingredient in the personality of caudillos who governed
after independence and which is today a deeprooted value in
the society.
A small middle stratum was made up of less successful
whites and those mestizos who were able to gain some educa-
tion or wealth. Engaged as clerks, traders, teachers and
petty bureacrats or in the forms of nonmanual workers, mem-
bers of the middle stratum usually lived in urban areas and
emulated the values and behavior of the upper class as closely
as they could.
The lower class was rural and largely undifferentiated;
the majority of its members were poor peasants, usually of
pure or mixed Indian or African descent, and their lifestyles
reflected the amalgam of cultures they inherited. Hispanic
influence was found at the structural or institutional levels
in such things as local government, the Spanish language
and the Catholic religion. Restricted by skin color and
poverty, and frequently by law, the lower class could not
fully adopt all the values and behavior patterns of the
upper class and so formed a folk culture that differed in
25

several aspects. Among those, the matriarchal system was
chosen instead of the patriarchal.
As time evolved, both usage and law reinforced the rigid-
ity of the social structure and the distance between the
classes, where the whites (both Peninsulares and Criollos)
considered themselves to be innately superior to their non-
white compatriots and took every possible measure to maintain
social distance. But in the eighteenth century, Spain's
crown began selling "dispensas de color" (color dispenses)
which allowed their purchasers to enjoy the prerogatives
and status of white men, regardless of social background.
From here stems a widely used proverb of "El dinero blanquea"
(money whitens the skin) , and this eventually contributed to
the liberalization and relaxation of discriminatory practices
based solely on skin color. When the Independence War was
fought (from 1810 to 1329, when Venezuela declared its inde-
pendence from La Gran Colombia) , all types of classes were
intermingled for the fight of freedom. However, it was not
until 1854 that President Jose Tadeo Monagas declared free-
dom to all slaves and declared that never again should such
an antihumane system be instituted. [Ref. 14]
Peninsulares was the term used for the whites born in




2 . Today's Society
Before the oil era began in the mid-1920s, about 70
percent of the Venezuelan population was rural, illiterate,
and poor. Over the next fifty years the ratios were reversed,
at least to the extent that more than 75 percent of the pop-
ulation became urban and literate. No social group has
escaped the impact. Accelerating opportunities brought large
numbers of immigrants, increased the size and power of the
middle class, created feelings of cohesiveness , and created
a sector of organized workers within the lower class.
The upper class was quick to see the advantages of a
growing economy and soon took over the fields of commerce
and industry, moving to consolidate its wealth through urban
pursuits. Upper class dominance in the economic sphere some-
what inhibited the ingress of a middle sector. As a conse-
quence and in view of the tenuous hold the upper class
exercised over the political svstem, the middle class found
a greater access to mobility through political power and
soon solidified its hold on the government. The author
would like to indicate that this trend has continued over
the last fifty-three years. It is demonstrated by the fact
that all of its presidents, civilian and military have come
from the middle class. The polarity that developed between
political and economic power blocs and the orientation of
each, came to reflect the differences in their social origins.
27

In spite of massive movement and increased differ-
entiation within the society there are indications that the
traditional social order has been preserved to a great degree
The traditional rural sector has reaped few of the benefits
of development, and its social structure remains essentially-
rigid and static. In urban areas class boundaries have be-
come slightly more permeable, but the main change has been
the increased opportunities for mobility within each class
[Ref. 15]. The author wants at this point, to introduce an
interesting concept developed by the Venezuelan researcher
Silva' Michelena , in which he uses the idea of "class status"
instead of "class strata", which according to him is more
inclusive because it involves class identification and socio-
economic status as well as decisional control over the means
of production [Ref. 16]. It is important to mention as pre-
sented in the extensive research done by Baloyra and Martz,
that after. they devoted a lot of effort and analysis in order
to establish a differential profile for the classes, their
results were not conclusive enough to indicate that Venezuela
has a well and clearly defined class strata. [Ref. 17]
3 . Religious Characteristics
In 1976 (latest available data) , some 90 percent of
the people in Venezuela were baptized in the Catholic church.
Several thousand Jews are concentrated in the major cities.
As a result of missionary efforts about 2 percent of the
population was Protestant. A small number of Indians
28

continued to practice their rituals and religions but some
of them are still adopting Catholicism. Religious freedom
is guaranteed by the Constitution of 1961, as it has been
since 1836.
Relations between the church and the state have been
Jiarmonious throughout most of the current century and have
continued to be peaceful up to the present. Due respect is
accorded to the church through its representatives, who are
always guests at all important ceremonial functions. Clergy
are not barred from politics but they have gradually defined
its role in society in accordance with recognition of the
state's preeminence.
One of the most significant and traditionally one
of the most important areas of church involvement in the
Venezuelan society is in education. Catholic schools have
traditionally educated the children of the middle and upper
class (because of high tuition fees) which, of course, began
to draw criticism. Since the 1960s, attempts have been
made by the hierarchy of the church to establish some control
over the schools, to encourage the admission of a greater
number of scholarship students, and to increase the number
of schools with little or no tuition. The results in the
1980s have been that more than two thirds of the Catholic
schools and colleges are free in some regional areas or com-
petitively priced in the more populated regions.
29

Even though the image of the Church's role has changed
in the public view, traditional attitudes and reactions
toward religion show little modification. Venezuelans con-
tinue to practice a kind of Catholicism that adheres only
loosely to church doctrine but is deeply emotional. Laxity
in practice is widespread, as is a low level of general
knowledge of the basic tenets of the faith.
Of the various elements of religious practice, those
with a more solemn aspect are less popular than weddings,
baptisms and the celebrations of saint's days (today, it is
still a big event in the less populated areas) , all of which
provide the opportunity of social contact in a festive atmo-
sphere. Frequently the religious significance becomes sec-
ondary to social concerns. Moreover, affairs sponsored by
the most affluent become occasions for a considerable degree
of ostentation, as is usually indicated by the resultant
criticism from the church's hierarchy.
In all classes, religion is regarded as properly
the sphere of women. More conscientious in religious prac-
tice, within the family they are expected to assume the duty
of religious and moral education of children. For girls
early training is followed by close supervision in accordance
with the socially protected status of the female sex. On
the other hand, boys are somewhat short of discouraged from
religiosity. Moreover, as experience and contacts outside




In the university environment, where liberal and
communist inclinations are strongest, antireligious influ-
ence is especially great. Many times, marriage and other
social engagements might lead to a greater compliance with
outward form, but its basic view toward religious practice
remains unchanged. Although devotion is not openly criti-
cized, it obviously is not a positive element in the Venezuelan
ideal of masculinity. [Ref. 18]
4 . Economic Characteristics
The Venezuelan economy has grown at a very rapid
rate in the last four decades. In 1935, Venezuela was one
of the poorest countries in Latin America; in 1981 output
per person was higher than that of any other country in
Latin America and rivaled that of some developed countries.
In between, the economy experienced average real growth of
seven percent per year, double that of the population growth
rate. Compared to any other country for a similar period,
there is agreement in saying that the performance of Vene-
zuela has been awesome.
Economic growth has been irregular, however. In
some "good" years, growth exceeded ten percent (as in 1951,
1956-57, 1964, 1972, 1974 and after). In other years, growth
was only slightly in excess of population growth. The pace
of the economy has followed closely Venezuela's petroleum
market. In the 1950s and 1970s when petroleum demand rode
high, so did the economy. The petroleum price break in 1958,
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the relatively stagnant petroleum sector in the 1960s and
the most recent fixing of prices below what the country ex-
pected, resulted in recession and sluggish growth during
those time spans.
Structural economic change accompanied growth. Agri-
culture stabilized as a portion of the economy holding now
the third position, following petroleum and most recently
industry, commerce and services. The labor share of national
income increased but the distribution of income among social
and economic classes has remained highly unequal. The source
of income is 29 percent extractive, 6 percent agriculture,
10 percent commerce, 11 percent manufacturing, 10 percent
transportation and communication, 6 percent construction and
28 percent in other services including government. The in-
come per capita is today estimated at somewhat over 4,300
U.S. dollars.
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY
As conclusion of this chapter, Table 1 summarizes, in a
condensed format, the most important cultural and social
traits typical of the Venezuelan environment.
The author wants to emphasize that Table 1 does not in-
tend to portray a stereotype, but rather to portray a repre-
sentative set of traits that would be very easily noticeable
by any knowledgeable observer.
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF VENEZUELAN SOCIO-CULTURAL TRAITS
- Religion: Mostly Catholic.
- Family Dimension: Paternalistic. Father is the key figure
in the family group. High familism. Strong bond among
father and child.
- Social Group Size: Usually large. If too small, the
"compadrazgo" system is a usual mean to enlarge it.
- Social Status Differentiation: Basically where exists two
classes- -the haves and the have nots . Within each there
is no jumps, but rather a continuum. In between lies a
currently stagnant middle class.
- Sex Role Differentiation: "Machismo" is still a strong
tendency and so is the "Marianismo" , i.e. the pattern of
female submission.
- Race Discrimination: Almost nonexistent. Seldom is this
issue even brought up.
- Attitude Toward Life: Always optimistic. Never too much
concerned about tomorrow nor the long term future.
- Trust: High distrust of nonfamily, high trust within
family.
- Power Distance: High between those that are perceived to
have power and those that do not. High respect for rank
and position.
- Appearance: Highly sensitive about external appearance;




The study of individual and social change in organiza-
tions has been carried out by researchers, as well as behav-
ioral scientists versed both in psychology and sociology.
It is important to note that not long ago, systematic attention
to organizational change was viewed as both unnecessary and
unreliable. This orientation was often reflected in a psssive,
reactive pattern of management which emphasized short run
adaptations as opposed to developing long run adaptability.
A. WHAT IS ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT?
In attempting to answer the question: What is Organization
Development, a variety of concepts have been expressed by
leading experts in OD:
• Richard Beckhard defines it as:
"An effort (1) planned, (2) organization wide, (3) managed
from the top, to (4) increase organization effectiveness
and health through (5) planned interventions in the or-
ganization's processes, using behavioral science knowledge."
• Warner Burke of Columbia University defines it as:
"A process of change in an organization's culture through
the utilization of behavioral science technology, research
and theory. More specifically, for an intervention in an
in an organization to be OD, it must (1) respond to a
felt need on the part of the client, (2) involve directly
and collaboratively the client in the planning and imple-
menting of the intervention, and (3) lead to change in
the organization's culture."
This set of definitions was obtained from The Academy
of Management OD Newsletter , Winter 1978.
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• Robert Golembiewsky , from University of Georgia, defines
it as :
"In intent, OD constitutes a value loaded, theory based
set of interventions that seek a simultaneous, multiple
pay-off: Meeting individual and group needs, while con-
tributing to the long run efficiency and effectiveness of
large systems."
• Edgar Schein, from Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
defines it as:
"OD is all the activities engaged in by managers, employ-
ees, and helpers which are directed toward building and
maintaining the health of the organization.
OD is for the total organization what group building and
maintenance is for small groups. How it is done, by whom,
and by what means will vary. What defines it is the goal
of a healthy organization.
OD should not be associated with what the consultants and
helpers do. A healthy organization can develop itself;
its managers are the primary practitioners of OD. But
just as healthy individuals or groups need help in main-
taining their system health, and such help can come from
internal or external consultants. OD experts should
therefore be experts at helping. They should not get
caught up with any particular technique such as survey
feedback, team building, etc., but should stay focused
on how to help."
The above definitions, while but a small sample of viewws
on a growing field of research and application, they basi-
cally encompass all the more relevant issues involved in
the development of such interdisciplinary body of knowledge.
It would be a simplistic assumption then to state that the
main objective of OD is "to change an organization", because
it is much more involved and complex than that. In the
past, change was something that management sought to minimize
and endure. Gradually however, most managers have come to
perceive change as not only something which is inevitable,
but also a key to organizational survival.
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Greiner (1967) makes this point quite well when he writes:
"A passive philosophy of managing change was adequate in less
competitive times, when small patchwork changes, such as re-
placing a manager here and there, were sufficient to maintain
profitability. But now the environments around organizations
are changing rapidly and are challenging managements to be-
come far more alert and inventive than ever were before."
[Ref. 22] Even though this was said fifteen years ago, its
real impact was not fully perceived until the last five
years. And, in some areas, it is still creating a shock
today due to the lack of fit between what was thought of as
a stationary environment and the organization interacting
with it. Examples of this include today's big auto compa-
nies' difficulties in meeting the Japanese challenge, the
Agrarian Reform and the Social Security crisis in Venezuela,
the U.S. crisis in the Welfare System, and so on.
Faced with a dynamic environment, the effective manage-
ment of change is now a critical concern for any manager
affected directly or indirectly by it. It is then, with a
dynamic organization in mind, that the author will examine
some critical aspects of the planning and execution of the
development of the organization.
B. CHANGE AS A SYSTEM
Change, as defined in Webster's Dictionary, has many
accepted meanings. Among them are: "to put or take something
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in place of something else", "to make different, to alter",
"to substitute", "to alter or vary." Hence, it's easy to
note how hard it will be to identify in specific words such
a generic definition that might encompass the idea of change.
The author will define "change" as: The real or perceived
reaction generated as a result of a real or intended action
upon the up-to-then current situation.
There are three (3) typical types of change that can be
identified in organizations; namely: a) Change in organiza-
tional structure or policy; b) Change in the people component
(personnel) ; c) Change in the nature of the business or in
the technology. For illustration, possible changes in each
of the components described above will be listed.
• Changes in organizational structure or policy could be:
Work flow changed from purpose to process, a new incen-
tive plan is developed, the Unit reports to a ne\v position
in the organization chart, the organization changes
name, the lunch hour is changed, the organization is
changing its commitments, etc.
• Changes in people (personnel) could be: The Chief of
the unit is replaced, a poor performer is fired, a
different or opposite leadership style is implemented,
more people are added to a small unit, half of the unit
quits, etc.
• Changes in the nature of the business or in technology
could be: Shift from manual to automated systems, a
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more powerful computer system is installed, the core
mission of the unit changes, the unit goes from one to
multiple lines or services, power tools substituted for
manual tools or vice versa, etc.
Of course, the lists are not exhaustive. However, it is
important to notice that not all of them would have the same
impact or be equally harmful or beneficial to the organiza-
tion. The ability of an organization to accept, adapt and
implement changes has been called "health" of the organiza-
tion by R. Beckhard in his book Organizational Development:
Strategies and Models . These conditions are:
1. The total organization, the significant sub-parts,
and individuals, manage their work against goals and
plans for achievement of these goals.
2. Form follows function (the problem, or task, or project,
determines how the human resources are organized)
.
3. Decisions are made by and near the sources of infor-
mation regardless of where these sources are located
on the organization chart.
4. The reward system is such that managers and supervisors
are rewarded (and punished) comparably for: short
term profit or production performance; growth and
development of their subordinates; and creating a
viable working group.
5. Communication laterally and vertically is relatively
undistorted. People are generally open and confront-
ing. They share all the relevant facts including
feelings
.
6. There is a minimum amount of inappropriate win/lose
activities between individuals and groups. Constant
effort exists at all levels to treat conflict and




7. There is high "conflict" (clash of ideas) about tasks
and projects, and relatively little energy spent in
clashing over interpersonal difficulties because they
have been generally resolved.
8. The organization and its parts see themselves as inter-
acting with each other and with a larger environment.
The organization is an "open system."
9. There is a shared value, and management strategy to
support it, of trying to help each person (or unit)
in the organization maintain his (or its) integrity
and uniqueness in an interdependent environment.
10. The organization and its members operate in an "action-
research" way. General practice is to build in feed-
back mechanisms so that individuals and groups can
learn from their own experience.
The important concepts described above highlight the
complex set of variables that enter into the change process
at the individual, group, or organizational level. For this
reason, the author will describe one of the models known as
the INPUT-OUTPUT Model in the Systems jargon. The schematic
is shown in the figure below.
Inputs to the system will be any attempt to bring about
changes. This could be from the environment, the technology,
as a consequence of influence techniques by management, or
as a reaction from its own output. Whether the Output will
have a positive (functional) , negative (dysfunctional) , or
neutral impact will depend on a large number of variables
intervening as part of the transformation process. The var-
iables mediate the acceptance or rejection of those changes.
Similarly, they also influence the nature of the consequences






Figure 1: Input Output Model of Change as a System.
As an example, no matter how technologically sound a
proposed change, if the organization components are too in-
flexible to accept change, neutral or negative consequences
are likely to occur from the change. Explanations of some
terms used in a proposed change are: A Functional or Posi-
tive Output would be like a growth of profits, increased
number of people, job enrichment, improved job satisfaction,
etc. A Neutral Output would be the maintenance of the status
quo; and a Dysfunctional or Negative Output would be a de-
crease in profits, people terminated, high turnover develops,
etc
.
It is also important to mention the concept developed by
7Burns and Stalker of Organic and Mechanistic organizations.
They use the term "Organic" for those "that have found it
7






easy to adapt to changing environmental demands", and Mech-
anistic for those "that resist change by their very nature."
Hence, an Organic organization could be thought of as being
"healthier" than a Mechanistic one.
The transformation process which is done through the
intervening variables, i.e. flexibility of people; organic
vs mechanistic type; perceived consequences of change; lead-
ership change methods; flexibility of structural factors;
commitment of management to change; etc., is a key issue in
the model. By understanding the interaction between inputs
and the transformation process, the outcome could be pre-
dicted to determine whether the change would occur or not
and if it does, whether it will be sustained or not.
A very important issue arises now. The common factor
in all the action/reaction schemes are the human beings in-
volved in the system; hence they are the ones to be consid-
ered if a successful change is to be achieved. A way to
consider this factor might be by trying to identify the
effects of change upon people. It has been found that the
impact of the change is a function of: a) the magnitude and
type of the change and b) the person's capacity to tolerate
change. Reactions to change can be major or minor, diffused
or focused, and psychological and physiological.
As has been indicated in the literature [Refs. 26, 28],
any change generates stress which can be a result of anxiety
growing out of uncertainty about the future. A way to cope
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with or diminish the stress might be by lowering the anxiety-
factor which, in turn, could be achieved by treating employ-
ees supportively , creating supportive work environments,
trying to avoid value conflicts and understanding social and
cultural beliefs, values and traditions.
The resistance to change can be manifested in many dif-
ferent ways. Basically, it springs out from the people
perceiving a change as a threat to their emotional or finan-
cial security. Also, they usually fear a change in their
human relationships (social change) that generally goes with
technical change. There are several ways in which resistance
manifests itself, and the author thinks it is important to
note them because their presence and their intensity could
be used as "barometers" for measuring the "resistance pres-
sure." Among other factors that could be identified, the
author would mention: a) A passive-aggressive behavior, i.e.
expressing hostility through inaction or by obeying the
rules/instructions strictly, b) Resentment (emotion) in
response to higher authorities' orders or instructions on
how to comply with the change, c) Direct aggressive behavior,




C. HOW TO DEAL WITH RESISTANCE TO CHANGE
There are many perspectives offered in the literature
concerning how to reduce resistance to change. Some that
the author considers more applicable to this paper are:
1. Select positive people; i.e., people least likely to
resist change or those committed to the change (using
Beckhard and Harris' idea of the "critical mass"),
[Ref. 29].
2. Avoid coercive tactics; try the usage of the "shaping"
technique in order to induce people to behave in a
congruent way with the change instead of trying to
do it by negative reinforcements. [Ref. 39]
3. Try to get as many flexible people as possible (flexi-
ble in the sense of willing to compromise for the
sake of the benefits of the change)
.
4. Provide valid information, thereby reducing the fear
of the unknown by telling them the scope and context
of the forthcoming changes so they will have a more
structured situation to perceive. Of course, the
information provided about the future should prove
correct as the change evolves (at least within accept-
able limits)
.
5. Minimize social changes; i.e., try not to disrupt the
interpersonal or social relationships that might have
been established unless this can not be avoided.
6. Avoid preoccupation with technology, try to build
confidence in the outside consultants, if any, or in
the change agent (s). Assist the change agents to
understand that the reaction of the people is more
important than trying to force acceptance of their
techniques and purposes. Realize that people affected
by changes are more concerned about these effects
than upon the technical features of the change method
or the change agent.
7. Use shared decision making; i.e., allow people to
participate in changes that affect them. This, by
8Among the many works written, the most relevant to this
topic are those written by Paul R. Lawrence, George Strauss





the way, is related to point one above because when
you get an individual or group of individuals contrib-
uting ideas to a proposed change, disapproving or
resisting that change later will be equivalent to
disagreeing with oneself.
8. Use economic incentives, if possible, as part of the
process so the fears of reducing the income as a result
of the change can be overcome.
As a conclusion to the line of thought then, the author
would say that the idea of thinking of change as a system
is valid, and so is the idea of eventually developing a
model that might encompass a large amount of the variables/
parameters
.
D. OD MODELS FOR PLANNED CHANGE
In general, it can be said that Planned Change Models
rely heavily on outside help; i.e., the use of OD agents.
Implementation is viewed as a dynamic process involving
collaboration between users and designers, to determine
patterns which are either effective or ineffective in achiev-
ing successful implementation. Once the patterns have been
established they can be translated into strategies and tac-
tics which users and designers can employ to improve the
chances of success in their projects. Then, the process
approach focuses on managing where the earlier models of




1 . Kolb-Frohman Model
This model is based in viewing the OD agent's inter-
vention in the client system as a total OD program. An
intervention then, is an OD intervention if:
1. It is not undertaken as an isolated event, but rather
with consideration for its impact on the organization
as a total system, and
2. It is directed not only at solving the organization's
immediate problem but also at improving the organiza-
tion's ability to anticipate and solve similar problems.
The model can be represented as a seven-step approach
with two feedback loops as indicated in Figure 2. [Ref. 53]
The first feedback loop from PLANNING to ENTRY,
defines the need for continuing renegotiation with the client
in the light of the DIAGNOSIS and PLANNING activities; i.e.,
keeping the dynamic approach. The second loop from EVALUATION
to PLANNING, defines the need for using the evaluations of
previous actions to modify planning activities.
SCOUTING: Here, still a preliminary stage. No
commitment has occurred from either part. The OD agent is
scouting his own interests, values and priorities in order
to decide if he is to work with the client's system. Usually
the first question to answer is "What about their perception
of the problem and of myself that led them to contract me?"
Also, an investigation of the clients' previous engagements
with OD agents and the outcomes of that. This aspect can
show a lot about the trends and tendencies of an organiza-


















Figure 2: Kolb- Frohman Model.
this scouting process is the choice of a formal entry point
into the client system. Before doing the entry in the client
system, it's important to identify and understand the power
structure of the system.
ENTRY: At this point, the OD agent and client sys-
tem, usually through the entry representative, begin the
negotiation of the contract. The use of this term "contract"
by Kolb and Frohman is "to define if and how the succeeding
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stages of the planned change process will be carried out."
They went on and listed ten areas in which agreement should
gbe reached. Here, they pose a heavy emphasis on the impor-
tance of trust based power, which they define as "that informal
influence that flows from collaborative problem definition
and solution." Hence, to create and reinforce trust based
power, it is necessary to establish a collaboration relation-
ship between the client and the consultant.
As the planned change progresses and new information
is gathered, it might be necessary to renegotiate the contract.
Why? In the first place because the nature of the problem
might change under the light of the change that had already
taken place. Secondly, because the OD agent's particular
expertise may become more or perhaps less relevant to the
client system. Then, after settling these details, the
process moves to the next step.
DIAGNOSIS: This phase focuses on four key elements:
(1) the client's felt problem; (2) the client's goals; (3)
the client's resources, and (4) the OD agent's resources.
The start of the diagnosis with the client's "felt problem",
does not mean to copy his words--it involves appreciating
the client's system's culture and language, being in his
9The ten areas are basically the OD agent and client's




shoes to see problems the way he sees them. This empathy is
fundamental to ensure the client's involvement in the diag-
nosis process. Also important is to identify the subparts
of the system where the problem or problems are located and
the interrelations of those subparts with the rest of the
system. This is a key issue in order to be able to antici-
pate the effect of the change in that one part of the system
will have over the other components. The next step in the
diagnosis process is to define the client's goals; i . e .
,
_to_
what desired state is the client striving? The resource
agent of client and OD agent's are those which are going to
be useful in improving the client's situation. Basically it
means answering questions such as: Is the client system really
committed to the solution of the problem? Are the key indi-
viduals responsible for implementing the change committed?
Are the OD agent's motives well defined? (Are they looking
for prestige, genuine desire to help, scientific experimenta-
tion or publicity?)
Another aspect to watch carefully is the client sys-
tem's reaction to the OD agent itself as a change agent.
Is he considered as an intruder? Is he considered a threat
or a helper? Is the system's climate tense or relaxed? An-
swers to these questions will provide an assessment of how
likely a success will be.
PLANNING: This phase should proceed in close cooper-
ation with the client to insure that the plans are appropriate
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to his needs and that he will understand them and be com-
mitted to their execution. At this stage, the specific
behavioral objectives to be achieved by the change should be
set. This key part will make the evaluation process easier.
Having fulfilled the setting of objectives, alternative sol-
utions or change strategies can be generated. Each alter-
native should indicate what source of power will be used to
implement it and to which organizational subsystem the
intervention is addressed. Kolb and Frohman mention six
subsystems to be considered:
The people subsystem - manpower and education.
The authority subsystem - formal and informal.
The information subsystem.
The task subsystem - human satisfaction; technological
change.
The policy/culture subsystem - incentive/reward structure;
norms, values.
The environment subsystem - spatial dispertion, society,
labor, market, etc.
ACTION: This is the phase when the best change
strategy developed in the previous phase (planning) is im-
plemented. If everything was well done before (in the pre-
vious phases) , everything should go fine and smoothly.
Typically, the problems found in this phase can be traced
back to unresolved issues in the previous phases. Many
times the failure of most plans is due to failure to antici-
pate the social change that goes with the implementation,
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either power alterations, obsolescence discoveries, lack of
participation by the affected people, etc.
EVALUATION: This phase can be done either by the
same client-consultant relation or could be done by an out-
side consultant hired for this effort. The evaluation is
conducted in terms of the specific objectives defined during
the planning phase as well as interim task goals designed
to determine if the change is progressing as desired. Eval-
uation also could be done by the client itself if he can use
information generated for self -analysis so he could monitor
the progress of the action phase and evaluate the data himself
TERMINATION: The relationship between client and
OD agent is by definition temporary and the termination con-
ditions should have been clearly defined and agreed upon at
the initial entry contract. There exists, of course, two
possible outcomes of the change effort- -success or failure.
Success has two main aspects: first, achievements of the
goals outlined in the entry-diagnosis -planning phases, and
secondly, the improvement of the client's ability to solve
by himself similar problems in the future. Failure is, of
course, a more embarrassing situation for both the client
and the OD agent and is often solved by very sour ways.
This, in a very brief way, highlights the key points
of the Kolb-Frohman approach to planned change.
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2 . Lewin-Schein Model
The Lewin-Schein theory of change emphasizes the
various organization forces resisting change. In order to
overcome this resistance and ensure long term achievement
of change, change must be considered as a three step process:
Unfreezing, Moving or Changing, and Refreezing. [Ref. 34]
Unfreezing entails the disconf irmation of existing
stable behavior patterns; i.e., overcoming resistance to
change by introducing disequilibrium into the present stable
equilibrium.
Moving or changing is the action phase of the change
effort. This requires the presentation of information nec-
essary for change and the learning of new attitudes and
behaviors which are necessary parts of the change.
Refreezing refers to the stabilization of the change
and the integration of attitudes and behaviors into existing
patterns and relationships. It is important to note that
refreezing does not mean to imply stagnation. Indeed the
whole process of unfreezing, change, and refreezing is viewed
as in iterative process.
E. A BEHAVIORAL MODEL
Management of change in complex organizations as has
been said in previous sections, can be equated to management
of change in uncertainty. Then, as uncertainty is a way of
life, what is intended when managing change is to increase
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the probability that the expected outcome occurs. Human
systems, and organizations as well, need some certainty and
also have a need to get positive feedback and to reduce nega-
tive feedback. If the reduction of negative feedback does
not reduce the level of anxiety, the organization will try to
defend itself either by fighting the change effort or just
by closing itself off (ostrich attitude). [Ref. 35]
The nature of the organization's world will exist in
terms of complexity and uncertainty within its particular
environment. Then, the questions to answer are: How does
OD cope with them? How does OD reduce them? How does OD
manage an uncertain and dynamic environment? There have been
many different attempts to answer all or most of these ques-
tions. Usually the attempted approach has been by developing
models, usually named behavioral models, one of which will be
described next.
1 . Action Research Model
This model was developed by a group of behavioral
scientists as a conceptual model for an early organization
improvement program in a series of oil refineries. Herbert
Shepard, one of the behavioral scientists involved in that
program, defines the nature of action research as follows:
"The action research model is a normative model for learn-
ing, or a model for planned change. Its main features are
these. In front of intelligent human action there should
be an objective, be it ever so fuzzy or distorted. And in
advance of human action there should be planning, although
knowledge of paths to be objective is always inadequate.
Action itself should be taken a step at a time, and after
52

each step it is well to do some fact finding. The fact
finding may disclose whether the objective is realistic,
whether it is nearer or more distant than before, whether
it needs alteration. Through fact finding, the present
situation can be assessed, and this information, together
with information about the objective, can be used in plan-
ning the second step. Movement toward an objective con-
sists of a series of such cycles of planning-acting-fact
finding-planning." [Ref. 36: p. 133]
From the above, it follows that action research is
an approach for problem solving, using what could be labeled
plain common sense; i.e., define objectives, work up a strat-
egy to achieve them (planning)
,
perform data gathering and
analysis to ensure realistic measures of how adequate is
the approach been taken to achieve those objectives, as well
as the objectives themselves. Then, perform a step (action)
and reevaluate, which basically means recycle back to measure
against the closeness to the objective (research). Depend-
ing on the outcome, do more planning and keep going until
the objectives are totally achieved.
In this process, an OD agent is typically required.
His main roles are to help management to plan its actions,
and to develop procedures and processes for fact finding
(feedback) which at the same time can be used as a learning
experience for them. This process will help to improve the
managers' skills and help them to set more realistic objec-
tives and also to improve the ability to organize.
Then, it is easy to see that action research is a
continuous sequence of events and actions oriented toward
the fulfillment of a specified set of objectives. The
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interesting idea behind this model is that even though it
seems extremely simple in its concept, its implementation
requires heavy involvement of the client organization. Also,
to take effective actions, it requires research to identify
practical problems, including the existence of standards
so that measurement can be done.
No matter what the arguments are, it is true that
action research models do have real and philosophical values.
One is that action in the real world should be accompanied
by research on that action so that feedback can be obtained,
and then a cumulative body of knowledge and consequences can
'be established to solve future real life situations. The
other is that action plans and programs conceived and designed
for solving real problems should be based on reliable and
true data generated by the interaction of OD agent and client.
This means that the action evolves as a consequence of the
findings presented as a diagnosis.
F. THE VALUE SYSTEM OF ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT
OD relies heavily upon behavioral science. Where it
draws most heavily is in understanding the expected and di-
versified behavior reaction that the human component will
have when subjected to a change process. Hence, the author
will turn attention to a description of the basic components
of human behavior, such as attitudes and values. The author
will not discuss "belief systems" in detail because it is
54

beyond the scope of this thesis. However, for the purpose
of laying groundwork, Milton Rockeach's definition of beliefs
as "those inferences made by an observer about underlying
states of expectancy", will be used [Ref. 23].
It is important to note, that since most causes of behav-
ior are not directly observable, the observer has to depend
on his or her perceptions. It is the perceived rather than
the actual determinants that are used to explain behavior.
Furthermore, even though a situation is the result of numer-
ous factors, it is usually preferred (based on need for
simplicity) to search for a simple cause-effect explanation.
This obviously can lead to inaccurate evaluations of the
behavior of others. As the OD observer views things through
his own perceptual filters, his views are influenced by his
own attitudes and beliefs. Therefore, OD specialists must
make a special effort to overcome their own biases so that
the client's behaviors and attitudes are accurately perceived
Client behaviors can only be influenced if the causal atti-
tudes are understood.
The next step, then, will be an attempt to define atti-
tude within the context of the individual and its environment
Attitudes will be defined as "regularities of an individual's
feelings, thoughts, and predispositions to act toward some
aspect of his environment" [Ref. 24].
A very extensive discussion of this term as it has
evolved in time can be found in the most recent work
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From the definition just presented, it is derived that
responses to a stimulus can be classified into three cate-
gories or components. One is the Cognitive Component or the
perceptual responses and verbal statements of belief (thoughts,
ideas, beliefs the person has). Another is the Affective
Component or the sympathetic nervous responses and verbal
statements of affect (Feeling Component) . The third is the
Behavioral Component or the overt actions and verbal state-
ments concerning behavior (the tendency to act consistently
with attitude). Consequently, an attitude may be considered
as a way of thinking, feeling, and behaving [Ref. 25: p. 20].
There is extensive literature about attitudes, their char-
acteristics, their functions and their shaping. Hence, the
author will not pursue further description, but rather will
go into the analysis of an approach to how to change or
influence attitudes.
1 . Attitude Change
This section will deal with the concept of "attitudes"
within the organizational setting as well as their impact in
the individual's behavior. A specific OD technique will be
introduced as an example.
Traditionally, efforts to change attitudes have
sought to modify the behavior, thinking, and feeling of the
published by Ajzen and Fischbein Understanding Attitudes and




situation. Furthermore, there seems to be agreement among
investigators that attitudes toward any object are determined
by beliefs about that object [Ref. 25: p. 62]. One of the
most direct but complicated approaches to dealing with an
undesirable attitude is to attempt to change the accompany-
ing behavior. Typically, coercion or discipline is the first
thing that comes to mind. However, the traditional role of
discipline when exercised, subjects the individual to nega-
tive reinforcement resulting from threats of such things as
temporary layoff, demotion, or arrest. Even though this
seems to induce a change in his or her behavior, what is
often achieved is to change behavior to the smallest degree
needed to avoid punishment. This might create a need for
tighter supervision which eventually will lead to higher
costs and job dissatisfaction. This, which shows the opposite
of what was intended in the first place, might occur when
discipline is applied. Furthermore, the undesirable attitude
may not have changed at all and possibly has become more
negative than before. Generally, discipline is perceived
by the subordinate or employee as inconsistent, unfair, and
a criticism of his or her personality rather than of behavior.
For these reasons, as well as others, dealing only with the
behavioral aspects of an undesirable attitude, especially




In many cases, management has sought to change
employee's ideas and beliefs; i.e., the Thinking Component
of an attitude. Very frequently, an undesirable attitude
may be the result of insufficient or misleading information.
In these cases, giving the right information and presenting
facts will have a good chance of modifying the attitude. An
attitude that has a deep, emotional content probably will
not be changed by just providing information or even reason-
ing. By providing new information, management might be
introducing new cognitive elements that may cause dissonance
within the individual. It is hoped then that the dissonance
generated by the new information will be sufficiently strong
to induce that individual to change his or her thinking about
the topic under discussion.
A much more difficult dimension of an attitude for
the OD consultant to deal with is the feeling dimension.
The reason for this is that it requires an attribute not
very usually found, namely, the ability to listen. It is
the author's personal view that this trait is very difficult
to find in action-oriented managers, which constitute the
majority of the modern Venezuelan Military Management.
Within the many techniques available in the OD arsenal, one
very relevant to attitude change is the "Active Listening"
technique. This technique requires the receiver to understand
This is particularly important in the Latin American
setting as will be discussed in the next chapter.
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exactly the idea that his sender intended, The receiver has
to be a sympathetic listener. As for the atmosphere of the
interview, it should be an understanding and nonthreatening
one in which the sender feels free to express his feelings,
problems, and attitudes. Such an atmosphere is not created
by chance and requires a large amount of time and effort
[Ref . 26] . Active listening can be used to affect changes
in attitudes and help to create a better work atmosphere.
It also relieves the sender of some of the tensions that he
or she is experiencing. By doing this, it is easier to ex-
plore courses of action that might be required for further
change. Even though communication does not by itself produce
outstanding human relations, negative emotions can prevent
the kind of thinking necessary for problem solving and for
developing goal-oriented behavior.
Numerous job factors are perceived by the employee
and influence his or her attitude toward each aspect of his
or her world. One of the most common approaches to changing
attitudes is to modify the situations that are the source of
the unfavorable attitudes. Potentially disturbing conditions
are located and identified by the use of opinion or attitude
surveys that typically contain questions about supervision,
work conditions, pay, and other organizational variables.
This permits the employee to assess the job factors as he
perceives them, as well as those that have influence over
each aspect of his work world. In this method, questions
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are structured so that the employee can register his opin-
ion and also indicate as to what degree he is for or against
it. This process will eventually allow management to enhance
the quality of work life by changing those perceived situations
that reinforce dysfunctional attitudes.
This section, then, has explored some of the under-
lying theoretical concepts of attitudes as a component of
human behavior. Some thoughts were presented and some exam-
ples provided as well as some possible approaches as to how
to influence behavior through the feeling dimension.
2 . The Values of People
Values, for purposes of this paper, will be under-
stood to be "the desirable and status or conditions that
one would like to see prevail above all others." [Ref. 27]
As a consequence, then, values form the basis for an individ-
ual view of the world and provide a sense of coherence and
unity to living. Also, the definition implies that since
values represent the individual's concept of an ideal rela-
tionship or state of affairs (the colored crystal concept)
,
they are used to assess what is right or wrong. As a result,
they are the yardsticks that allow for comparisons, evaluations,
decisions, and actions. This particular trait will have to
be understood in a twofold way. First, as values in the
client or affected organization and secondly, as those of
the behavioral scientist, OD consultant, or change agent.
Concerning the first, the members of the system, in general,
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will value collaborative efforts and the results that the
collaborative system produces.
For the collaborative system, there is a basic assump
tion to be stated, and that is that the nature of man and
his work in an organizational context, must be a critical
area of consideration for management. This in turn will
exert a powerful influence in the process and technology for
developing more fully functioning organizations. Then, OD
programs will have to be designed to provide better quality
of work life and welfare for all the members of the organi-
zation. This will dissipate the belief that they are manip-
ulative techniques to be used by any particular group to
exploit others, or designed to obtain welfare by some, while
others are being sacrificed. This particular value must be
developed and articulated very early in the OD program and
any misunderstanding or incongruence should be worked out,
or the whole effort might turn out to be a failure.
It is, of course, evident that any OD approach will
fail if either the system members place no value on the
goals of the organization and/or have some ideological com-
mitment to chronic dissension, turmoil, anarchy, violence,
destruction or hate. This means, then, that some values
must be in harmony between organizational members if group





As for the second, values of the change agents or
OD consultants, although not all of OD consultants completely
share the same values, the literature [Refs. 27, 28, 29, 30],
12lists the following:
Seeking to increase the effectiveness of the organiza-
tion in terms of all of its goals.
Treating each human being as a person with a complex
set of needs, all of which are important in his work
and his life.
Providing opportunities for people to function as human
beings rather than as resources in the productive
process
.
Providing opportunities for people in the organization
to influence the way in which they relate to work, the
organization and the environment.
Providing opportunities to each organization member, as
well as for the organization itself, to develop to his
full potential.
Attempting to create an environment in which it is pos-
sible to find exciting and challenging work.
In addition to the previous set of values , change
agents might also hold values such as to allow feelings and
sentiments as a more legitimate part of the culture of the
organization and, hence, enrich and give more meaning to
their work and life. The risk here is that putting too much
emphasis in this value, some organizational realities can
be forgotten or minimized. Another typical value is that
concerning democratization of the organization or what is
12 This listing does not intend to present any ranking
or order of importance.
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known as "power equalization". While this is usually intended
to humanize the work place or to get into a democratic-
participative way of life, for many this might imply a threat
to reduce or minimize the power of owners or managers. There-
fore, it is important to add that the OD agent will have to
make his or her values and beliefs visible to both themselves
and their clients. Not doing so can very easily lead to
distrust and hinder trust building and mutual learning.
[Ref. 28]
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has covered a very wide array of material,
all of which represents a strong techno-structural foundation
for most of the thesis. OD was discussed and presented from
different perspectives. Then, an essay was presented arguing
that change be understood as a system. Later, discussion
was offered on how to cope and overcome resistance to change.
Several models were presented to achieve organizational
change and within them, the individual's behavior was con-
sidered. The last section of the chapter was devoted to
review the value system of OD, taking into consideration
the attitudes and values of the people in the organization.
This whole process was presented in a somewhat theoretical
or abstract view of the real world. The next chapter will
integrate these concepts such that a real application to the
Venezuelan Navy's environment can be achieved.
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IV. A MODEL FOR THE VENEZUELAN NAVY
A. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SELECTED TRAITS
Preceding chapters have pointed out that OD can not be
applied directly in a Latin environment as it is presented
in the literature. Authors are, by and large, either from
European or Anglo origins. They have offered ideas and
approaches that would make sense when applied to particular
societies and cultures. To attempt to directly apply those
theories, ideas, and concepts in cultures different to those
for which they were intended, will be doomed to failure.
Such may the case if OD techniques are applied directly to
the Latin American environment. Why? Because their cultural
values and belief systems are different in many respects.
As was discussed before, OD relies heavily on the behavioral
sciences; i.e., behavior is a key element. When the systems
that shape behavior are different, then, without any doubt,
the behavior will be different. Hence, the OD approach
must be reoriented, adapted, or tropicalized (as the author
suggested before) , in order for it to be really effective
in this different setting. Before going into the analysis
of the applicability of OD in the Venezuelan Navy's environ-




1 . Socio-cultural Traits
Before discussing traits, the author warns that
when he claims that a cultural group or society has some
attribute, it does not mean that everybody in that group or
society has it, or has it to the same degree. Also, it may
be said that variations are large and patterns of language
and culture vary within Latin America. Even then, the author
assumes that there are some generalizations that could be
made in order to reduce or simplify this variation. This
assumption is based both on personal observation of the
author (who has lived in both cultures) , and on the work by
Triandis (1981) about intercultural variations [Ref. 38].
Leadership - When considering leadership in the
Anglo culture, leaders follow a more optimistic or democratic
assumption about the capacity and initiative of the average
employee. They usually agree with the desirability of shar-
ing information about the objectives of the organization
instead of issuing narrow and detailed instructions or pro-
cedures. They also place a strong emphasis on control and
believe that money is the primary mechanism for doing so.
The approach in the Latin culture is that leaders usually
exhibit an elitist and autocratic attitude. They are usually
negative about communicating anything but a narrow set of
instructions, reducing the possibility of subordinate partic-
ipation and control. They tend to feel that subordinates
have little ability, little more to offer than muscle, and
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that they are not to be trusted. Frequently, information
is withheld or manipulated so that the leader can maintain
power and control.
Nationalism - Defined by the Webster's dictionary
as: 1. "National spirit or aspirations", 2. "Devotion to
the interests of one's own nation", 5. "Desire for national
advancement or independence", it can be stated that nation-
alism is based on a relation, usually in terms of loyalty
and duty, to the concepts of "nation". Nationalism, then,
is a cultural phenomenon, the result of people's social be-
havior and the integration of personal identification with
national group identity. The Anglo feeling of nationalism
is fundamentally based on principles of natural law and
reason. Usually manifested by heavy emphasis on national
defense, national pride, fight for freedom and liberty,
believing and promoting the "American way of life", and so
on. Also, this concept involves popular sovereignty, rep-
resentative and constitutional government, individual rights
and the rule of law. In the Latin culture, nationalism,
even though the definition is basically the same, is inter-
preted usually in terms of emphasis upon achieving national
economic goals, to create respect for sovereignty, awareness
of own political power, and willingness to use new social
models to remedy poverty and raisallocation of resources.
Frequently this concept is invoked to perform "nationaliza-
tions", which means nothing more than property appropriated
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and kept as property of the state, usually performed to
exclude foreign private capital. This has been repeatedly
used in Latin America to portray toughness and "National
Pride."
Attitude Toward Work - When analyzing the attitudes
toward work, the Anglo culture has since colonial times,
viewed work as a means for group survival, group and individ-
ual well-being, as a source of self -achievement , and as a
means to gain respect and recognition. In the Latin culture,
the heritage left from colonial times is one of regarding
manual work as a legacy from slavery. Hence, upper and
high middle classes regard manual work as something to get
away from. This feeling is in some instances extended as
a general repulsion to work because it might be related to
identification with the low end of the social strata. Also
from colonial times, there is a cultural tendency of a pred-
ilection to judge the value of an individual by personal
traits and family relations, over the record of performance
which might otherwise readily separate the fit from the
unfit. This same trait has evolved into the preference among
businessmen to favor relatives and friends in commercial
enterprises and governmental offices. In the Anglo culture,
there is a greater amount of impersonal treatment to the
individuals when applying for work. Laws have been enacted
to insure this, such as the Equal Rights Amendment, Equal
Opportunity Employment Act, etc. Furthermore, work is
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considered dignifying and linked to the "Protestant Ethic",
as a means to achieve social status, well-being, security
and comfort.
Productivity - This has been a key issue for many
years in developed countries. The Anglo culture has built
into its system a "productivity-oriented" society by creat-
ing understanding and agreement in making the best use of
its resources in order to increase output, while at the same
time minimizing waste and idleness. A recent trend is to
attempt to keep increasing productivity, while at the same
time improving the quality of its products, in order to cope
with the Japanese challenge. In the Latin culture, produc-
tivity maximizing has not been an explicit objective. Fore-
most interest is typically to satisfy a required or specified
quota without too much concern or worry about the quality of
products, nor the adequate use of inputs. It is important
to note, however, that in those organizations where adequate
and "tropicalized" incentive and reward systems have been
implemented, productivity has equalled and even exceeded
that of organizations in developed countries.
Motivation - Motivation is "that internal drive that
forces people to act and to sustain certain behavior." In
the Anglo culture its main drives are to make money, to be
satisfied with work performed, to have a say, and to be
able to shape the way things are done. People can be labeled
as action oriented. In the Latin culture, the drive is mostly
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for achieving status and prestige, to gain, retain and dis-
play power, to be socially accepted by many, to have a lot
of "amigos" (friends), and to have fun and enjoy life. Money
making is not a primary objective. Usually they do feel
satisfied by earning just enough to have a decent life, be
free of debts and to be able to socialize with their friends
and families.
Concern about Time - The Anglo culture places high
value upon "time" and treats it as a scarce resource ("time
is money", they say). Usually timetables are established and
followed. Controls are enforced simply for this sole purpose
The Latin culture does not place that heavy emphasis upon
"time". There is always a chance for "manana" (tomorrow).
They are not too concerned about keeping appointments or
dates. Frequently these are cancelled or simply forgotten,
because the "boss ran into an old friend" and decided to
socialize rather to rush back to fulfill his agenda. It is
also the case that the person or persons waiting for him,
after a certain amount of time, will understand that he will
not show up and leave with no hard feelings.
View of Management - In the Anglo culture, manage-
ment has evolved a long way and is regarded and treated as
a science, closely intermingled with many others. Managers
are somewhat like scientists relying on expert knowledge,
discipline and experience. The decision making process is
usually evolutionary, a result of sharing of ideas and
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expertise. The decision maker usually weights his decisions
against its effects on productivity and on the return of
investment as well as the security of stockholders; i.e.,
profitability. In the Latin culture, management is regarded
as an art. It is accepted that managers and leaders are not
made, they are naturally born that way. If somebody succeeds
in managing well in some area, there is a tendency to apply
the halo effect and assume that this individual will perform
equally well in any other managerial position. Because of
this, it is common to see very young and sometimes newly
graduated nonmature professionals in key positions in govern-
ment and even in industry. Also, management still has some
linkage to the "patron" concept and it in turn resorts to
"macho" decisions; i.e., "You better do it because I said
so and I don't have to tell you why."
Religion - The Latin culture is mostly shaped under
the Catholic structure and the church poses a strong politi-
cal influence. In the Anglo culture, most of the influence
is from the Protestant religion, and the church does not have
such strong political influence.
Adaptability - The Anglo people are harder to adapt
to systems with different characteristics from their own.
Their reaction is very typical of the "cultural shock"
phenomenon; i.e., isolationism, denial of qualities of the
host country, closing together in tight groups. The Latin
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These traits are summarized in Table 2. Examina-
tion of Table 2 indicates that the OD approach will have to
be modified if it is to succeed in a Latin environment.
Typically, OD is structured to place emphasis on the group,
in team building, in improving communications. If that same
approach is taken to a Latin environment, it simply will not
work. The author proposes that OD should be modified so as
to take into account the differences. As a result, emphasis
will not have to be placed upon the group, but on the leaders,
and after convincing them, they will support the effort and
provide incentives for the subordinates to follow.
The author now will narrow his scope to focus on how
to modify OD for its application in the Venezuelan Navy, as
well as present its advantages and disadvantages.
B. WHAT IS THE VENEZUELAN NAVY LIKE?
In chapters one and two, the author offered several gen-
eral comments describing some characteristics of and challenges
facing the Venezuelan Navy. Before going further, some de-
tailed information will be presented in order to help the
reader to assess and understand the organization that is
being addressed. The Venezuelan Navy and the Air Force are
the two smallest services of the country's Armed Forces.
Their combined manpower is composed of about 1,200 officers,
1,400 petty officers, 8,000 enlisted and 4,000 marines. Its
fleet is composed of 56 ships, from frigates with SAM missiles
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to torpedo boats, including submarines and auxiliary ships
for personnel and material transport. It also has a Naval
Air Force with helicopters and A/S Tracker planes. It main-
tains four naval bases in seaports and one in the Orinoco
River. Its ordinary operating budget is about 100 million
dollars, without accounting for any extraordinary additional
credits
.
The leadership is conducted by two senior officers, the
Comandante General and the CNO , both Vice Admirals. The
typical senior officer is a Naval Academy graduate, with at
least a Bachelor's degree in either engineering or science,
and graduate level degree (Master's mostly), either from
civilian universities, War Colleges or military universities,
Their main concerns are to improve readiness, achieve higher
effectiveness, and to make the best usage of their human,
financial and material resources. The main problems they
face today are to cope with sophisticated weapon systems,
both in use and being acquired, to reshape their training
facilities, to develop highly qualified technical personnel
to build enough and efficient technical facilities, and to
have efficient logistics for keeping the systems going. It
is within this context that the question appears: How could




C. CHALLENGES FOR OD IN THE VENEZUELAN NAVY
The author has brought up many areas and ideas widely
available for theoretical applications. Suggestions were
made concerning its practical applications in real life sit-
uations. One interesting aspect of OD is that it has proved
workable, subject to certain characteristics of the host
organization. In reviewing the literature on OD, this author
could find no documentation of OD experience in developing
countries. The introduction of OD supporting activities
and goals has all the characteristics of a pervasive process.
The reasons favoring a positive decision for this type of
development are to provide enhanced organizational climate,
improve effectiveness, increment commitment, optimize cost
effectiveness, increase flexibility, and improve operational
procedures. They have been widely reported and discussed;
however, the practical results from these projects have either
not been reported or have received less attention than the
comments recommending them.
Even though the procedure used for each host organiza-
tion in introducing some form of organizational improvement,
is dependent upon its characteristics (size, complexity,
structure, degree of formalization, culture, environmental
The author wants to emphasize that this does not imply
that there are no such documents. It simply means that he
was not able to find any.
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setting, preparedness, etc.). there seems to be agreement
concerning some basic steps. These steps are said to be
found in the evolutionary process that takes an organization
from one certain stage at a certain time, to a new stage in
some pre-defined future time [Ref. 29]. Evidence reveals,
however, that though the steps to be achieved are uniquely-
similar, the problems to be faced are not. This is especially
true when the application of the process is in an organiza-
tion with very traditional values, and furthermore belongs
to a developing country. Such is the case of the Venezuelan
Navy.
The main reason for this difference is rather simple but
not obvious: the theory, the practice and the available
statistical facilities have almost always been produced and
applied first by developed countries and have had a mutually
interdependent growth. Thus, each reached comparable levels
of sophistication because any forward step by one focused
attention on the need for more sophistication of the others.
This has not been the case in Venezuela and by extension,
has not been the case in its Navy. Several attempts have
been made to implement some of the OD approaches but without
a concerted or planned strategy. The results have been un-
satisfied users, expensive and nonefficient solutions, and
loss of confidence in further attempts. The most recent
attempt on record for a general approach was the "Master
Plan for Systematic Integration of the Navy" (Plan Maestro
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de Sistematizacion Integral de la Marina - PMSI) [Ref . 7]
.
This was conceived under what could be loosely referred as
an OD approach, but it failed to recognize the true needs
of the host organization. Hence, the result was not a real-
istic assessment of either the problems, nor the flaws which
created the need in the first place. Learning from the
mistakes, the Navy realized that there was a lot of truth
in the valid documents, but they failed to make the best use
of them from an organizational standpoint. Since then, there
have not been any integrated attempts to engage in any OD
effort. This stems partly from the previous experience and
partly because of the unwillingness on the part of the new
leaders to engage in anything that might imply a new attempt
to make a global change in the status quo.
With the previous information as background, the author
proposes that before any other attempt is made to engage in
OD designs, it is important to note that there are limiting
factors to consider that affect the context of the design.
First, not all organizations are culturally prepared for OD
.
Second, even when the organization is culturally prepared,
only gross models are available for guiding organizational
change. In effect, both of these limits on OD designs,
demand high degrees of insight, sensitivity, and adaptability




D. CULTURAL PREPAREDNESS OF THE VENEZUELAN NAVY
No available measurement instrument permits a judgement
as to whether or not the Venezuelan Navy is culturally pre-
pared for OD, but such judgements must be made. The advan-
tage is that OD designs are applicable over a broad range
of conditions in organizations with a diversity of missions,
histories, futures and cultures. Knowledge of the broad
applicability of OD designs is comforting for some purposes,
but relying on these benign boundaries will be inadequate in
the Venezuelan case for several reasons: First, conditions
do exist under which a failure is most probable, and it is
important to know those conditions. Second, specific designs
(or packaged ones) , may be more or less appropriate under
various conditions. Finally, the conservation of internal
energy encourages some awareness of the limitations which
could reduce the possibility of success in specific cases.
These imply then, that at least initially, change efforts
could (and should) be concentrated in units or subunits
where the probability of success is high. The OD approach
seems more applicable under conditions of substantial ten-
sion in a system, such as those resulting from an organiza-
tion's inefficiency, inability to adapt or change, or whatever
On the other hand, under very low levels of tension, as in
highly successful organizations or units, the motivation
for OD is likely to be low, even if concerned individuals
correctly perceive the dark clouds behind the silver lining.
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Typically, when this occurs, those issuing the warning are
either not believed or simply ignored. Paradoxically, when
tension in the system is extremely high, an OD approach may
be sorely needed, but its probability of success will be low
1 A
because the tension or threat is immobilizing.
Even though it is implied that OD will only be focused
on improving the processes, relationships, communications,
and so forth, it is not intended to imply that it excludes
application of OD when the processes are good. For example,
if there is something new to the organization, like a new
objective, task, or challenge that might require new pro-
cesses, such change can also be helped by OD techniques.
How? This is achieved firstly by helping to keep the same
quality of work environment, while at the same time embracing
and satisfying the new objective or change, and secondly
by reinforcing the internal processes and helping with the
external such as solving communication problems, conflicts
and interactions.
Another important aspect of cultural preparedness is the
quality of inter-unit relations within the organization.
Given good inter-unit relations; i.e., low degrees of conflict
or disruptive competition and high degrees of collaborative
efficiency, an OD effort is not especially needed. On the
It is the author's opinion that the PMSI in Venezuela
failed for this very reason.
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other hand, when there is a deterioration in the quality of
the inter-unit relations the need for an OD effort increases,
as does the motivation to make it succeed. However, there
is a certain nonquantif iable and often subjectively defined
point where deterioration exceeds even the capability of OD
efforts to help with improvement.
Remembering that this thesis focuses on a Latin American
environment, the legitimacy of focusing on interpersonal and
intergroup relations constitutes an important aspect of the
organization's cultural preparedness for an OD application
(for more details, see the section about Today's Society in
Chapter Two, and about Values in Chapter Three). Where this
legitimacy is already high, the need for, and impact of OD
designs will be reduced. Up to a point, decreases in the
legitimacy of dealing with human relationships heightens the
need for OD, and increases the probability of its effective-
ness. On the other hand, the legitimacy may be so low for
enough organizational members so as to stymie an OD effort.
Such low legitimacy might be expressed as extreme resistance
to "probing or psychological aggression", or even as "viola-
tions of privacy".
Another dimension along which to assess the cultural
preparedness of the Venezuelan Navy, and an important one,
is the level of resistance of key officials. As before,
despite the inability to be specific about what the words
mean, "too much" resistance can mean the death of the OD
79

program or programs. This is true not only for key officials
who formally control resources (material, financial, or
information) , but also includes those who are viewed as
having informal power. Our culture attaches considerable
legitimacy to any perceived as powerful figure, even when
that figure's power may not be due to formal organizational
position. At the other end, there may be no such thing as
too much support from key officials. But excessively enthu-
siastic support by key officials may be interpreted by other
organizational members as an effort to manipulate them.
Then, for all that was said above, the author thinks that
an approach to use for assessing the preparedness and initi-
ating the effort should be to use as change agent somebody
from within the organization- -preferably someone from middle
management- -say , a staff man in personnel, data processing
or finance. That change agent should be someone with the
following characteristics: knowledgeable of the organization;
conceptual, and skilled in the OD area; and have relationships
with outside experts and organizations. Now, the person
who can best satisfy that profile would be for example, in
the military somebody with the rank of either lieutenant
commander or commander. Why? Because most of the people
that have been sent to graduate training are today within
those ranks. Furthermore, the military provides the inside
information, and the rank provides the organizational exper-
ience, credibility, leverage, and relationships. He then
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can develop a relationship with some prestigious outside
expert, while at the same time developing local support in
his organization. At some point, while support is developing
at lower levels, an effort needs to be made to begin develop-
ing support for continuity at the higher levels. One strategy
for doing that will be to establish a series of briefings
and presentations to the executive levels (captains and rear
admirals)
.
These would be relatively passive information
exchange sessions appropriate for senior officers, who may
be unaware or even hostile to OD. The overall progression
then, will be one of reverse cooptation, or perhaps could
15
even be called manipulation from below.
This concept of the utilization of a change agent is, as
presented in Chapter Three, a distinguishing characteristic
of OD. Although this change agent should belong to the
larger organization, say the Venezuelan Navy or the Ministry
of Defense, it is strongly advised by the author that he be
external to the particular subsystem initiating the OD
effort. French and Bell (1978), stated that they were "some-
what pessimistic about the optimal effectiveness of OD
efforts that are do-it-yourself programs" [Ref. 28: p. 16].
Also, there is a point about discussing external versus
Much of these ideas have been extracted from Dr. Reuben




internal change agents on economic grounds, but usually turns
out that the external agents are preferrable, at least
initially. This way the resources and expenses needed to
sustain an internal staff will be avoided. Furthermore, the
Venezuelan Navy should assign an internal counterpart to
interact with the external agent so that a learning process
takes place. The organization would then gain expertise
through the individuals involved. This expertise could be
transferred overtime to other subsystems, eventually creating
a group of qualified internal OD change agents who have de-
tailed knowledge of the organization climate and culture as
well as its people. It is important to note, however, that
the operating base of the change agent must free him from
the obligation to blindly support particular power groups
in the organization. If this is achieved, a strong possi-
bility for continuity will be accomplished.
OD tries to achieve teamwork in an organization through
analysis of the team culture and by developing team skills
in planning, setting objectives, and problem solving. This
is done in order to increase communications and interactions
between work-related groups, and to replace different areas
of personal and sometimes conflicting interests, with ones
of common interest and thus develop an awareness for the
need for interdependence of action and the best efforts of
all groups. This approach is consistent with the concepts
taught at the Venezuelan Naval War College, but the author's
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experience has shown that theoretical concepts have been
hard to implement in the Venezuelan Navy. It will be suc-
cessful only if enough key individuals can be convinced of
its pay-offs and how it might benefit them in their profes-
sional careers.
E. FACTORS HELPING THE INTRODUCTION OF OD IN THE VENEZUELAN
NAVY
There are several positive factors which encourage the
introduction of OD, namely:
1. Support from senior officers.
2. The recent reduction in the nation's income.
3. The size of the Venezuelan Navy.
4. Manpower problems.
Each of these is explained as follows:
1) Support of Senior Navy Officials - OD efforts to be
successful in the Venezuelan Navy's environment, require a
formal mandate by top leadership. Top Management has shown
some interest in getting into new programs and also has demon
strated a desire to improve the organization effectiveness.
There has also been growing concern into utilizing sound
modern managerial skills and to incorporate new organiza-
tional techniques and innovations.
The author wants to indicate that the actual Navy policy
has signaled "Organization Theory, Management Science and





2) The Recent Reduction in the Country's National
Income - This fact, created by the recent oil glut in the
industrialized countries, has created a need for redimension-
ing of several programs, goals, and objectives which in turn
will create a need for changes. Some of the changes may be
of major proportions. Reductions in budget will force higher
productivity, or at least maintaining the present rate, while
inputs are held constant or perhaps lowered. This situation
alone creates a fertile ground for the OD approach because
it offers a means of maximizing the organization's potential
in several areas such as manpower, logistics, and finance,
while at the same time reducing sources of vulnerability.
3) The Size of the Venezuelan Navy - The Navy is, with
the Air Force, the smallest component of the Venezuelan
Armed Forces. It consumes, then, less material resources and
utilizes less manpower than the other services. Also, the
Navy has less complicated chains of command and less complex
communication channels are needed to keep a coordinated and
integrated system.
4) The Manpower Problem - The Navy has been experiencing
increasing personnel unrest that increases the vulnerability
of losing its valuable human assets. Most of this unrest is
attributed to low pay, and sometimes lack of opportunity for
advancement. Discipline is growing harder to sustain because
the private sector is a strong magnet for those capable
individuals who run into some kind of disciplinary problem.
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They typically resign or quit the service and move out into
the private sector. OD can help because one of its objec-
tives is to ease and allow communications to flow both ways,
upwards and doxmwards . This will allow the commands to have
managing flexibility so they can circumvent problems. Also,
as OD deals with improving the organizational climate and
the work environment, it can help to resolve problems.
F. FACTORS IMPEDING THE INTRODUCTION OF OD IN THE VENEZUELAN
NAVY
There are some negative factors which go against the
introduction of OD, namely:
1. Organizational structure.
2. Compliance with traditional leadership.
3. Budget and resources limitations.
Each of these is explained as follows:
1) Organizational Structure - Even though the Venezuelan
Navy is one of the two smallest components of the Armed
Forces, it still must coordinate activities and efforts, and
assure interaction and communication between numerous complex
and very diverse elements in order to accomplish its mission.
To achieve this, the Navy possesses an organization structured
as a hierarchical bureaucracy. The chain of command is firm-
ly delineated and its employment is emphasized in a very
typical pyramidal structure. The organization places a
central emphasis on efficiency, task specialization and task
interrelationships. These traits, as well as the motivational
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devices of extrinsic rewards such as income and status, the
structured and systematic form of rationality for organiza-
tion control, allow a tendency toward scientific management.
Within the Navy, promotions are a function of past accom-
plishments, merit and certain minimum time requirements at
each hierarchy or rank. The formal authority is a function
of rank, and command and sea duty positions are usually
considered as career-enhancing. From here, leaders in the
organization view organizational conflict as something bad,
unhealthy and reflective of leadership failure. This poses
a problem for OD because successful OD programs depend upon
an open recognition of conflict as unavoidable in organiza-
tional life and a desire to positively manage conflict situ-
ations [Ref. 32]. Also, the rank structure of the Venezuelan
Navy's hierarchy can contribute to deter success of intro-
ducing OD. Rank determines position of authority in general;
then, if lower echelons in the hierarchy are resistant to the
philosophies of OD for any reason, it can create frustration
for the commander. He might have to assume a high degree of
confrontation, which eventually might lower (in his perception)
the morale of his unit. He usually would settle for keeping
the status quo rather than "rocking the boat".
2) Compliance with Traditional Leadership - The Navy
has come a long way since its creation, by following a tra-
ditional style of leadership, based upon the fundamental rule
of obedience to the dictates of superiors, as is written in
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the Organic Legislation of the Venezuelan Armed Forces. When
any individual joins the Navy, he swears to defend his coun-
try and to be willing to die for it if necessary, in order
to accomplish his unit's mission. This concept has been
historically tested in real situations and has worked. Hence,
Navy leaders will be reluctant to depart from already deep-
rooted and tested leadership and command styles. Because
of these concepts, most of the need for leadership is placed
in those that will perform the planning of operations or
activities, and in those that will lead the execution phase
because everything else is based upon following orders.
This approach has allowed the Navy to keep tight control.
Perhaps some leaders might appear to feel that more collab-
orative methods will undermine their position and loosen
their control on the unit's operation and performance. As
leaders can delegate authority, but still are held responsi-
ble for the success or failure of their organizations, they
tend to keep a very tight grip and consequently fear leader-
ship methods which they perceive as threatening to their
personal control. There is a reluctance of some leaders to
consider themselves as managers because they must lead and
make decisions, where a manager may use group decisions to
help him decide what to do. Even though this perception
may be erroneous, the syndrome in the Venezuelan Navy that
a leader personally controls and solely directs does appear
to exist. As a consequence, OD will have problems because
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leaders will be hesitant or reluctant to request unit-wide
input for fear of arousing suspicions of weakness, uncer-
tainty, lack of decision ability, and lack of professional
knowledge.
(3) Budget and Resources Limitations - The Venezuelan
Navy allows for a very conservative and slow natural growth
(about ten percent per annum) , and then the introduction of
a widespread OD effort could be severely limited by resources '
constraints. The Venezuelan government developed a five year
plan, where resources for the public sector's organizational
improvement and renewal are allocated. An attempt could be
made to allocate the funds for OD under this plan, but this
will require the commitment of several key senior leaders
willing to engage in a congressional fight and to counter-
argue whatever objections the other services might bring up
regarding the use of these resources. This approach will be
successful only if enough high ranking officials could be
sincerely convinced and willing to commit themselves to a




V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. VALUE OF THIS STUDY
The author concludes that any immediate attempt to en-
gage in OD in the Venezuelan Navy, as it is typically prac-
ticed, will be doomed to failure. Even if the adaptation
process takes place (tropicalization) , there is still a big
effort required to achieve the cultural preparedness of the
organization. OD efforts, as generally practiced in civilian
settings, encourages open discussions of conflict, and active-
ly strives towards collaborative management, where the
Venezuelan Navy has its own strict traditional leadership
methods. While there may exist a thin veneer of collabora-
tive leadership, because of pressures, uncertainties, and
lack of continuity of leadership, traditional leadership
remains the norm and practice just beneath the surface.
The author also believes that even though "textbook OD"
could not be applied directly, it does contain two important
concepts which would be immediately beneficial for the or-
ganization as a whole, namely opening and expanding increased
channels of communications and developing a more enjoyable
and challenging working environment. As for the first, it
would mean opening channels of communication via frank and
honest discussion of local unit problems. This will require
skillful management by trained discussion leaders. Hence,
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the organization should devote part of its resources to
train individuals on conflict resolution and team building
activities. For the second, this will mean that as a result
of every individual knowing that he has a say in the organi-
zation and that he is considered to be an important link of
the chain, will give more meaning to his job and also will
help to fulfill the need for self-esteem and recognition for
all officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted personnel
The combination of the two preceding implied benefits
indicate a need for the organization to train and prepare
individuals in "Human Resources Management", as well as for
including formal courses of "Behavioral Science, Leadership,
and Organization Theory" in the curricula at the Naval
Academy, and to expand those at the Venezuelan Naval War
College. If this proposed scheme is followed, the organiza-
tion will have developed in a period of four to five years,
enough human resources knowledgeable enough to conduct, im-
plement, and evaluate OD efforts in a gradual basis as well
as in a contingency basis.
The underlying groundwork for starting the whole process,
will be to follow some simple OD concepts, namely a three-
step procedure: (1) assess the actual situation (either
by surveying or other diagnostic techniques) , (2) define
the desired future state, and (3) elaborate the transition
state lying between the present and the desired future,
taking into account the time constraints as well as the
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contingency plans to preempt and solve any possible critical
derailment or abnormal situation that might arise. Concur-
rently, get as many key individuals committed as possible,
and preferably choose them from different seniority, differ-
ent specialties, and different hierarchies , and status groups,
meaning basically to obtain a diagonal slice of the organi-
zation committed to the plan. If these suggested steps are
followed, it will provide the basics for strengthening the
factors that will help to get OD working in the Navy and to
weaken those factors and individuals opposing it.
The author wants to emphasize that the time has come to
attempt engaging with OD in the Venezuelan Navy. It should
also be stated that beyond any doubt in the author's mind,
that if an attempt to start an OD program is undertaken
without taking into consideration the many socio-cultural
differences that make Latino different, the whole effort
will be doomed to failure. The recommended approach would
then be to follow what was stated above, focusing initially
on highly visible, success-prone situations and then after
each successful result, turning to more ambitious programs.
In spite of the fact that resources are limited, now is
the time to start the OD effort. Partly because of resources
being limited, the organization is not growing; i.e., will
not have the turbulence of growth, expansion, and change.
This will give the chance of getting OD in the organization,
when there is time to think about it, to digest it, and to
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measure its potential advantages. All of this could be done
before the things turn around and the organization continues
to grow, without having created the capabilities to cope
with that growth more effectively. This last statement
implies that the organization should have OD in place, tested,
accepted and working to improve the organization before the
new demands on the organization arise.
The author emphasizes again that the process suggested
in this thesis does not imply a huge monetary investment;
he is talking about a few people who can help the leadership
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